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GUEST
EDITORIAL
Alfred Russel Wallace, past and future
Charles H. Smith
That an international biogeography society should name an
award after Alfred Russel Wallace (1823–1913) is both natural
and appropriate: he is, after all, the acknowledged ‘father’ of
the modern study of the subject (or at the very least of
zoogeography, one of its two main subdivisions). That being
so, there are probably very few among us here who are not at
least generally familiar with his life and contributions in this
realm. Very briefly, it was Wallace who, along with Darwin,
gave us the model – natural selection – that sustains a dynamic
view of the subject; he also made fundamental contributions to
a variety of more specific studies, for example: the nature of
island biotas, the process of corridor dispersal, the connection
between glacial epochs and distribution patterns, the relation
of river barriers to species divergence, the systematic study of
regional biotas, and – last but not least – astrobiology, and in
particular the ecoclimatological study of extraterrestrial surface
environments. We should perhaps additionally remind our-
selves that many observers also regard Wallace not only as the
leading tropical regions naturalist in history, but perhaps, in
more general terms yet, as its pre-eminent field biologist
overall.
Instead of dwelling on the obvious, I would prefer to focus
here on what I personally feel is Wallace’s most important legacy
for biogeographical studies: one which, I submit, does not
reduce to a matter of history alone. This concerns how he was
able to bring together historical and ecological approaches to the
study of biogeography – and in a fashion capable of sustaining a
logical process of investigation not only into the twentieth
century, but on to the twenty-first as well. To understand how
Wallace came to such a synthesis, we need return ourselves to his
days as a young naturalist, traipsing through the tropical forests
of the Amazon and Malay Archipelago.
At that point – the early and mid-1850s – Wallace was pur-
suing a research program that hinged on one understanding
that most observers of today, knowing what we know of
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ABSTRACT
The naturalist Alfred Russel Wallace (1823–1913) has for many years been
standing in the shadow of his more famed co-discoverer of the principle of
natural selection, Charles Darwin. Despite outward similarities between the two
men’s formulation of the principle, Wallace had fit his appreciation of natural
selection into views on evolution that were quite different from Darwin’s. A closer
examination of what Wallace had in mind suggests a model of process in which
natural selection per se acts as the negative feedback mechanism (actually, a ‘state-
space’) in the relation between population and environment, and environmental
engagement as made possible by the resulting selection of traits acts as the pos-
itive feedback part of the cycle. Thus, it may be better to contextualize adaptive
structures as entropy-relaying biogeochemical facilitators that only ‘generate a
potential for evolution’ than to portray them as the end results of evolution. This
systems point of view better lends itself to appreciations of the biogeographical
context of evolution than does the tree-thinking of a more conventional style of
speciation-focused Darwinism, which sometimes confuses process with result.
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Alfred Russel Wallace, deviation-amplifying processes, evolution, history of
science, natural selection, negative feedback, positive feedback.
This paper was invited for delivery at the second biennial meeting of
the International Biogeography Society, held 5–9 January 2005 in
Shepherdstown, West Virginia, USA. It was read on the evening of
8 January, on the occasion of the first presentation of the Society’s
Alfred Russel Wallace Award (for lifetime contributions to the field of
biogeography), to veteran zoogeographer John C. Briggs.
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his later writings, should find surprising. Specifically, he
was operating under the assumption that characteristic
organismal traits were not necessarily functionally utilitarian.
Two or three of his early writings are quite clear on this score
(see especially Wallace, 1853, 1856); he probably felt this way
largely because it appeared that to embrace notions of
necessary function was to support a view of a preordained
existence akin to, or exactly the same as, a first causes-based
creationism. What, then, was his provisional working model of
how the evolution of species proceeded? Although the evidence
is not yet absolutely conclusive, he appears to have adopted a
final causes-based scheme – one that looked to some fairly
subtle or remote environmental influence as pulling the
strings. In this understanding, individual adaptations were to
a certain degree incidental, coming into being for unknown
reasons, and then promoted or overturned by forces extending
well beyond the level of populations, much less individual
organisms.
An environmentally deterministic presence of this type might
be expected to relay various signs of its enactment through the
characteristic results of distribution and adaptation it yielded,
so Wallace made it his business to look for such. When in good
time he felt he had accumulated enough evidence to charac-
terize one such result – the spatial-temporal pattern of
divergence of species lines – he issued the paper ‘On the Law
Which Has Regulated the Introduction of New Species’
(Wallace, 1855). This featured his famous ‘Sarawak law’, the
notion that ‘Every species has come into existence coincident
both in space and time with a pre-existing closely allied species’.
The essence of this law, which many have marked as the dawn
of modern biogeographical studies, has sometimes been
forgotten: far from being a prescription for dispersalism, it is
more the archetypal example of tree-thinking. Some might
argue, therefore (and some have: see, for example, Michaux,
1991), that it looks ahead more to the dawn of vicariance
biogeography studies than it does to the kind of thinking
expressed by later workers such as Matthew and Simpson.
A reminder, however, that despite his embrace of this
principle – which we still endorse today – Wallace was not yet
at this point a believer in the necessary utility of adaptive
characters. In a little-known paper on the orangutan published
a year after the Sarawak essay, he continues to state in the most
explicit terms his belief that many adaptive structures have no
functional value:
Do you mean to assert, then, some of my readers will
indignantly ask, that this animal, or any animal, is
provided with organs which are of no use to it? Yes, we
reply, we do mean to assert that many animals are
provided with organs and appendages which serve no
material or physical purpose. The extraordinary excres-
cences of many insects, the fantastic and many-coloured
plumes which adorn certain birds, the excessively
developed horns in some of the antelopes, the colours
and infinitely modified forms of many flower–petals, are
all cases, for an explanation of which we must look to
some general principle far more recondite than a simple
relation to the necessities of the individual (Wallace,
1856, p. 30).
Obviously, something was going to have to give. Wallace
had for all intensive purposes shown through his Sarawak law
that evolution did in fact take place, but so far all he had was
an inductive demonstration of its results, and no model of
ecological or population dynamics that could explain those
results. Wallace had always recognized the importance of
morphological features in characterizing the basic differences
among species, of course, but apparently he was still expecting
to identify a final cause that bore ultimate responsibility for
guiding the longer-term fates of these various outcomes. Much
later, in his autobiography My life (Wallace, 1905, Vol. 1,
p. 360), he would refer to this time as a period during which he
believed it would be impossible to understand how and why
every individual adaptation had come about: seemingly, no
one causal process could be held responsible.
Then, in early 1858, during a bout with malaria, and while
he was thinking about the writings of Thomas Malthus on
population controls, the solution came to him. It was simple,
actually: as he had thought, adaptations were not preordained;
there was enough variation within every population to respond
adaptively to the multi-causal constraints and opportunities
afforded by environment, and enough time to allow all the
relative probabilities of operationalization success to play
themselves out.
Now a man named Charles Darwin had experienced a not
wholly dissimilar revelation some years earlier, and as events
transpired it was Darwin who would end up monopolizing the
stage in the theatre of nineteenth and twentieth century
evolutionary studies. And while it is true that the two men’s
conceptualizations of the principle had much in common,
there are also important differences between the Darwinian
and Wallaceian versions of natural selection – including one
which, I now suggest, will ultimately go in Wallace’s favour.
Darwin, though no mean observer of living things, tended to
think linearly – more like a geologist than an ecologist or
geographer – when pondering the mysteries of organic change.
Indeed, ‘tree-thinking’ was his forte, and he could not help but
look upon the key concept of adaptation as both a process and a
result. To this day we are dominated by this view that evolution
as a process yields particulate results – individual adaptations,
creatures and species populations – that stick out like so many
little twigs on the great metaphorical tree of life. Darwin and his
followers have been criticized for this alleged circularity in their
reasoning – even the phylogenetic systematists, the ‘twiggiest’ of
all evolutionists, are guarded on the matter, sometimes
disowning (or maybe ignoring) the more contentious specifics
of Darwinian theory and preferring to dwell, Wallace-like, on
objective facts of specimen morphology and location in space
and time. So far no one has seen any pressing need to abandon
the greater good to respond to this apparent lesser evil.
By contrast, in Wallace’s model of natural selection – even
after 1858 – there actually is no implied process of adaptation:
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there is only the logical result of being adapted. For Wallace,
adaptation represents a state-space: the logical implication of
the interplay of variation, over-achieving reproduction rates
and finitely limited resources. Actually, he usually referred to
his brainchild as the ‘law’ of natural selection, a usage we do
not see much these days. [Note in this context his attempt to
‘demonstrate’ (his word) the origin of species by natural
selection through the logic of necessary result on p. 302 of his
book Contributions to the theory of natural selection (Wallace,
1870)]. Wallace also has endured a lot of criticism for his
approach, most notably in the form of accusations of
hyperselectionism raised by historical science-focused natural-
ists like the late Stephen Jay Gould. But this ambush is not really
fair, as Wallace only reasoned that the whole of the evolutionary
process passed through the natural selection filter, and not that
natural selection itself initiated it. In fact, he pointed out on
many occasions that we were largely ignorant of the laws that
govern the origin of variation, and it reasonably can be argued
that all those subsequent theories and discoveries that have
been viewed as possibly overturning natural selection – e.g.,
mutation theory, Mendelism and more lately molecular
evolution – are no more than realizations of our efforts to
expose inherent causes of the type he alluded to.
For many years ‘Darwin versus Wallace’ debates over
various particulars of evolutionary theory focused on other
matters, many of which are of limited direct interest to
biogeographers: sexual selection, for example, and whether
natural selection can explain the existence of humankind’s
higher faculties. Then, in 1972, some hint of a possible new
order arose from a rather unlikely source: an anthropologist
exploring some elements of the then still-emerging science of
cybernetics. Gregory Bateson, remembering some intriguing
passages in Wallace’s Ternate essay likening the action of
natural selection to a governor on a steam engine (Wallace,
1858, p. 62), remarked in his Steps to an ecology of the mind
(Bateson, 1972, p. 435):
The steam engine with a governor is simply a circular
train of causal events, with somewhere a link in that
chain such that the more of something, the less of the
next thing in the circuit…If causal chains with that
general characteristic are provided with energy, the
result will be…a self-corrective system. Wallace, in fact,
proposed the first cybernetic model…Basically these
systems are always conservative…in such systems chan-
ges occur to conserve the truth of some descriptive
statement, some component of the status quo. Wallace
saw the matter correctly, and natural selection acts
primarily to keep the species unvarying…
Bateson was not content to let the matter go at that. Later, in
the collection Mind and nature: a necessary unity, he added the
following observations (Bateson, 1979, p. 43):
If it had been Wallace instead of Darwin [who started
the trend], we would have had a very different theory of
evolution today. The whole cybernetic movement might
have occurred one hundred years earlier as a result of
Wallace’s comparison between the steam engine with a
governor and the process of natural selection…
Bateson makes a very interesting point here, but he neglects
an important issue: clearly, models of the general evolutionary
program cannot rest entirely on negative feedback-based
mechanisms and explanations; it is ultimately the breaking
away from such recursive constraints that by definition leads to
novel development. Had Bateson dug a bit further he would
have discovered that the evolutionary relationship between
negative and positive feedback relations had already been
explored some years earlier in an important work titled ‘The
second cybernetics: deviation-amplifying mutual causal pro-
cesses’ (Maruyama, 1963). In this milestone paper Magoroh
Maruyama describes how the information imported to an
organism from the environment mediates two kinds of
feedback: deviation-countering processes (negative feedbacks)
which tend to enforce equilibrium conditions, and deviation-
amplifying processes (positive feedbacks), which cause systems
to change in directions either of greater or of lesser order.
While Maruyama’s perspective helps us understand how a
living system might be looked at as being either or both
equilibrium conserving and equilibrium countering, it still
does not specify the conditions under which directions of
‘greater or lesser order’ might be obtained; that is, what is it in
the longer term evolutionary sense that tips the scales in favour
of greater order?
This question leads us back to Wallace, and an opportunity
to re-examine some fundamental aspects of the relation
between biogeography and natural selection. We can begin
by entertaining the notion that Wallace’s initial struggle to
understand the adaptive process might have been due to his
early inability to distinguish between the negative and positive
feedback components of the system. As Bateson pointed out,
the ‘governor-like’ action of selective forces on existing
adaptations has the effect, over generations, of weeding out
poorly adapted individuals – an effect whose cumulating
results may be seen in changes in morphology at the individual
level. Historically speaking, one might describe this as ‘evolu-
tionary change’ or the ‘evolution of adaptations’, but unless
one can show at the level of the process itself why such change
need be negentropy-accumulating, we are left only with an
ecological reality: that adaptive structures are but the focus of
the negative feedback part of the cycle, operationalizing an
organismal state-space through which energy sources at the
surface of the earth are temporarily diverted and captured,
applied to do chemical and physical work, and then returned
in degraded form to the physical environment envelope (and
ultimately out into space), maximizing system entropy. From
this perspective adaptations are little more than one – though
admittedly complex – interface in the biogeochemical cycling
process.
Accepting this, one is inclined to wonder whether Wallace’s
early preoccupation with identifying large scale, environment-
level forcing functions that could drive evolution might still
Guest Editorial
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make sense. Adaptive structures aside, it would appear to be the
realization of adaptive potential – the entry into new ecological
involvements through organismal/population behaviour,
movement, and dispersal – that represents the positive
feedback part of the cycle leading to evolution. Because they
are not one-dimensional entities, organisms/populations can
and do enter into new associations with their environment, the
result being the sorting out of gene pools into new adaptive
structures. Some of these are adaptive in the short term sense
but not in the longer term sense, producing overspecialization
and, ultimately, dead-ends: extinction (an example of a
deviation-amplifying trend resulting in a reduction of order).
Others turn out to be adaptive across both time scales,
supporting a flexibility of genetics and structure that leads to
serial phylogenesis (a deviation-amplifying process yielding
longer-term, larger-scale, diversification, and thus higher levels
of order).
Recall that Wallace seems to have had in mind an
evolutionary process subservient to final causes. In his own
words, the ‘changes of organic forms’ are ‘to keep them in
harmony with the changed conditions’ (i.e. of the environ-
ment, characterized very generally) (Wallace, 1870, p. 302). We
are not accustomed to thinking in such terms in biogeography,
but it may be time to reconsider our position. It should be
apparent from the variety of stances taken by proponents of
the anthropic and Gaia hypotheses that, philosophically
speaking, the ‘final causes’ concept has produced the gamut
of teleological mind-sets. We need not, however, adopt the
more extreme of these to imagine how a system as described
here could find its way to higher levels of order. Suppose, for
example, that the environment as it physically extends away
from any given individual organism inherently presents
statistically greater survival probabilities in some directions
than in others. On this basis, individuals – and more
importantly, populations – might tend to disperse in some
spatial directions more easily than in others.
Further suppose that these survival probabilities are set by
the level of optimality of delivery, directly, and indirectly, of
certain very basic resources – for example, and most probably,
water – to the adaptive structures of the organisms mediating
energy transfer through the system. If this is so, perhaps the
degree of specification of selection required to fit into the less
ideal environments in this respect will be more than that
required to fit into more ideal ones: that is, that because there
is too much or too little of something vital at certain times and
places, a good deal more selection must go into establishing
adaptations that will continue to support morphostasis in
those places. This latter kind of selection will tend to produce
the kinds of specialized organisms whose populations will be at
greater risk should the environment change markedly at some
future point.
‘Optimality’ of delivery of resources must involve one
further consideration, however: how efficiently the living
structure supported can be turned over within the local
ecosystem for continuing re-use. The cycle of life and death in
any community is such as to influence the turnover rate of vital
resources in the local ecosystem. Temperature governs the rate
of biological modification at the molecular level, but here too
there is an optimum, as too great a deviation from the mean is
bound to have negative effects on the nature of stability at the
community level. If one couples a surplus of water with a
considerably higher than average mean ambient temperature,
for example, a little noted kind of stress on community
organization is imposed. Under these conditions in tropical
rain forests, great surpluses of water combined with high
temperatures produce leaching rates that keep soils depleted of
nutrients. The effect of this stress has been to force a
community structure in which most of the vital nutrients in
the system are kept locked up in inaccessible biomass at any
given time: they cannot be leached out of the system, but
neither can they be turned over quickly enough to support
productivity levels that match, for example, those of mid-
latitude grassland systems.
The preceding sketch describes what can be interpreted as a
mild form of final causation. In theory, as a population grows,
it should first find it easier to spread out in directions of lower
environmental stress as here portrayed, since the conservative
‘governing function’ of selection (a` la Wallace) to fit in will not
be as severe as in areas of high stress. Thus, the suggestion is
that all populations will tend to disperse in the same preferred
directions, in so doing non-randomly perpetuating genetic
flexibility – and, importantly, contributing to the shaping of
ever-more stable and resilient biogeochemical pathways. This
is evolution – environmentally mediated (or even directed)
evolution, to be sure, but not environmentally determined
evolution: again, as in Wallace’s thinking, that which is
selected for to meet the challenge in any given instance
constitutes whatever can be genetically sorted out, in large part
by trial and error, to support persistence.
In the mid-1980s I applied this line of reasoning in my PhD
thesis (Smith, 1984) and a follow-up paper (Smith, 1986) in
some detail. Not much came of the effort at the time; however,
as this was a period dominated by discussions on other ideas–
notably, non-equilibrium evolution, vicariance biogeography
and molecular evolution. In the two works just mentioned,
I suggested three immediate reasons why an emphasis on this
‘evolution as spatial interaction’ notion might be a preferable
starting point for complex environmental studies to ‘adapta-
tion-as-evolution’ approaches. These considerations still,
I think, are worthy of reflection:
1. To begin with, we are provided with means lending
themselves equally well to either state-space or process
modelling efforts. As part of a discussion concerning the
non-equilibrium theory of biological evolution proposed by
E. O. Wiley and Dan Brooks in the 1980s (Wiley & Brooks,
1982; Brooks & Wiley, 1986), Wicken (1983, p. 442) remarked
that:
…internal ordering depends on a system’s ability to
export entropy to its environment…The virtue of the
thermodynamic approach to evolution is its ability to
connect life ecologically to the rest of nature through
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shared matter and energy flows; denying the ecological
component of evolution, or the influence of ecology on
development, badly weakens (their) thermodynamic
base.
Wiley and Brooks’s theory, though provoking a good deal of
discussion over the years, has seemingly run its course. They
continued to defend it vigorously for a time; regarding the
matter of the effect of ecology on evolution they only claimed
to be ‘rejecting ecological determinism’ (Brooks & Wiley, 1985,
p. 94). In the understanding expressed here, the environment
does provide a forcing function, but this is viewed as
implemented at the community, rather than individual, level.
The environment can, I submit, effect direct control over what
kinds of spatial interaction processes operate among organisms
but only very indirectly, in the terminology of Brooks & Wiley
(1985, p. 93), over the way each population’s ‘phase space
defining the maximum number of microstates which the
evolving lineage could occupy’ changes with time (since this
phase space is, as Brooks and Wiley themselves would argue,
locked in as a function of the particular constraints and
potentials developed over the line’s own history, as ‘summar-
ized’ at any given time within its gene pool). Outside variables
(i.e., environmental delivery of vital resources) may thus be
interpreted as defining the state–space within which organisms
find themselves in the immediate sense, but not in such a
fashion as to subvert the ‘individuality’ of development of any
given evolutionary line. This overall causal structure has the
obvious advantage of lending itself to ecological state–space
description in which the controlling variables may also be
understood to produce change in a way that need not be
viewed as the kind of ‘ecological determinism’ that Brooks and
Wiley object to.
2. This portrayal of the complementary – but still entirely
separable – roles of spatial interaction and adaptation solves
outright the philosophical dilemma attending the earlier
mentioned complaint that in Darwinian thinking evolution
involves a process (adaptation) yielding structures (adapta-
tion) of non-independent definition (Ghiselin, 1966; Grene,
1971; Gould & Lewontin, 1979; Brookfield, 1982). As Lewontin
(1984, pp. 237–238) has put it, ‘The process is adaptation and
the end result is the state of being adapted …The problem is
how species can be at all times both adapting and adapted’.
When evolution is understood as the characteristics of change
in the spatial interaction regime at the community/environ-
ment level (and not ‘the process of adaptation’), the role of
adaptive structures can be viewed as strictly ecological,
providing a straightforward causal picture devoid of circularity
and attending logical difficulties. In this role, adaptations are
regarded simply (as described earlier) as structural attributes
matched to environmental throughput: they mediate energy
degradation, or, as Wicken (1983), p. 440) has put it, ‘provide
a means by which potential energy can be converted to thermal
entropy and released to space’.
3. Further, re-interpreting evolution as a spatial interaction
process provides a response to the complaint that the study of
the ‘evolution’ of adaptations (i.e. phylogenetic studies)
reduces to idiographic ‘narrative’ (Goudge, 1961). Particular
adaptations are still regarded, of course, as arising in response
to one-of-a-kind combinations of environmental and biologi-
cal circumstances; given ever-increasing complexity of genetic
constraints on the way change can be implemented, we should
expect the exact manner in which potential energy is converted
to thermal entropy to remain individually unique to each
population. Again, this understanding – focusing on the
homeostatic function of adaptation – resists any systematic
biological interpretation beyond the identification of when and
where each novelty arose (and the post hoc narrative sequen-
cing of this information with all other such information). But
when the homeorhetic function of adaptive structures – spatial
interaction – is emphasized, such criticism is rendered moot.
Following this interpretation makes it possible to think of
irreversible processes as leading to more than the unique
structures we call adaptations. Specifically, it in addition allows
us to consider standing interaction patterns interpretable on
normative grounds: in the biological sense, as competition/
natural selection, and in the spatial sense, as statistically
interpretable multi-species distribution patterns [in effect, an
answer to Eldredge’s (1981) complaints regarding the ‘just so’
nature of much of descriptive biogeography]. Like individual
organisms, species populations (and their particular constitu-
ent adaptive arrays) eventually die and disappear – entirely – as
functional (ecological) entities; not necessarily so, communi-
ties and ecosystems, that are more likely either to modify in
place, or be forced to disperse en masse.
To these three points two more may be added – briefly.
First, as it may be admitted that with respect to adaptive
structures evolution historically proceeds randomly (or at the
least, stochastically), it is likely the case that predictive
modelling based on this focus will always be limited to
identifying the immediate causal conditions involved. Wallace’s
original dilemma as to the means of origination of adaptations
is thus likely to be a permanent one. We can, of course,
identify certain classes of immediate results (such as mimetic
resemblance), or use any number of kinds of experimental
frameworks to relate specific cause to specific outcome – and
in turn manipulate particular processes to serve our immediate
ends (as, for example, in various medical contexts) – but there
remains the real problem that trying to generalize this
manipulation to the level of natural process is extremely
tedious, as no state–space common to all relevant factors can
ever be isolated. By contrast, if one regards the environment as
an information field across which populations disperse, and
with which they become integrated, one can begin to look at
process in terms of relative rates and directions of change
in space. If in fact such information fields exist in nature –
related most elementally, as I have suggested, to certain
optimalities in the rates of provision of fundamental resources
– then one should be able to identify population-level traits
that have developed in response to them. In my Dissertation
(Smith, 1984) I made a first pass attempt at this. Variations in
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soil moisture levels over the central United States of America
constituted the ‘resource’ variable studied; this was combined
with a similarly varying turnover-related multiplier based on
ambient temperatures (via Van’t Hoff’s law) to produce a
geographically varying indicator of eco-/evolutionary stress.
Reasoning that populations should disperse preferentially
according to the shape of this ‘stress field’, I examined range
boundary records for the over five hundred species of
mammals and herptiles occurring in the study area for
evidence of such an effect, and in fact found some fairly good
confirming evidence. Since that time much better distribu-
tional data and means of manipulating them have become
available, and more elaborate tests could be performed.
Further, and more importantly, tests of this kind could also
be applied to particular spatial patterns of gene flow within
individual populations (i.e., clinal analyses).
As a second point, and as suggested by comments made
earlier regarding differences in selection regimes, the kind of
approach advocated here could be instrumental in clarifying
our understanding of the relation between r- and K-kinds of
selection. Obviously, if evolution really is directly related to
how certain fundamental resources are made regularly avail-
able for procurement and retained and recycled, this influence
will find its way into all manner of associations between
adaptive strategy and the organism’s surroundings. In some
instances, for example, life’s economy may be dictated by
seasonalities; in others, an ease in finding hosts. Trophic level
organization, morphology and life histories should also show
signs of such influence.
In recent years many investigators have been attempting to
model spatial variation in diversity patterns by looking to the
possible associative influence of a range of independent
environmental variables: climate, soil moisture, ecological
complexity, energy levels and so forth (see, for example, Kerr
& Packer, 1997; O’Brien, 1998; Hawkins et al., 2003; Hawkins
& Porter, 2003). So far these efforts have lacked the dynamic
modelling perspective that allows them to do more than
correlate certain diversity characteristics with particular
ambient environmental conditions. These are not, therefore,
evolutionary models as they now stand, but it would not take
much re-orientation to turn them into such. Efforts of this
kind might give us a much more interactive view of the
meaning of biodiversity, and at the same time allow us to
follow Wallace’s original lead and understand that there really
is no generalizable ‘process of adaptation’. We need to pay less
attention to the ‘twigs’ themselves, and more to how they
generate actions eventually playing out in space and time as
responses to final causes inherent in the environmental
delivery system.
A full one hundred and fifty years have now passed since
Wallace’s ‘Sarawak law’ essay of early 1855 put us at the brink
of a biogeographical understanding that might have formed
the very central element of a symmetrically logical evolutionary
theory. Only three years later Wallace came up with the key
remaining piece of the puzzle, but to no avail: Darwin’s
conception of adaptation-as-evolution – tree-thinking – was
quickly to assume dominance on the stage of evolutionary
theorizing, and continues to do so today. There are signs,
however, that things may be changing. One immediate result
of the biodiversity studies movement has been the realization
that a biology (or conservation program) dominated by
independent investigations of individual species does not
bring us a level of understanding of the biosphere that will
ultimately be informative enough to preserve it. It appears that
we are, whether we care to acknowledge it or not, increasingly
on a search for final causes in the theatre of life. Alfred Russel
Wallace embraced this ideal so many years ago, and though he
had few theoretical vehicles through which he could express
this orientation, every fibre of his intellect was committed to it.
We cannot do better than to honour and affirm his commit-
ment through the connection of his name with our own goals,
both through commemorations of the type we are taking part
in this day, and through continuing efforts to explore and
extend his ideas.
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